ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Enabling the sharing of information remains a national priority, whether to support military missions, Government day-to-day operations, critical infrastructure services or business planning and execution. The National Strategy for Information Sharing [1] sets forth a plan for unifying the Nation's efforts to share terrorism related information. Both the DoD Information Sharing Strategy and the IC Information Sharing Strategy complement the National Strategy. This is evidenced by the DoD shift to a Net-Centric warfighting paradigm and reliance on allied and coalition force military operations, dependence on intelligence to sustain our homeland security, increased dependence to sustain our critical national infrastructure services, economic dependence on eBusiness, and the infrastructures necessary to sustain each of these. These dynamics continue to drive our dependence on IT enterprise services in the cyber world.
However, along with this comes the potential for disruption or exploitation of cyber attackers [2] . The statistics for cyber attacks continue to become more worrisome every day, whether for geopolitical (e.g., espionage or military advantage), terrorist, competitive positioning, cybercrime or personal agendas. We face this in a world where our reliance on operations with global partners has become a way of life, whether to enable global business operations or coalition warfighting partners. This has led to the need to support communities of interest (COIs) whether in a small corporate intranet or a global military enterprise.
With the prevalence and sophistication of cyber threats, most every enterprise has to adopt a defense-in-depth strategy. One objective of these is typically to implement and maintain positive control of our information sources and the enterprise services, networks and systems that provide it. Over the past several years, DoD has assessed the technical feasibility and operational viability of advanced system access control mechanisms. Leveraging the results of a Privilege Management (PvM) Operational Pilot initiative, the DoD initiated the Privilege Management Enterprise Solutions program to deploy commercially available web portal PvM solutions.
These solutions use sophisticated decision engine technology to determine if a user (identified by his CAC ID credential) with characteristics or attributes (e.g., nationality, security clearance and mission responsibilities) associated with that identity should be given access to specific information (characterized by labels referred to as metadata). These decision engines can also be set up to consider mission environmental data (e.g., INFOCON or DEFCON levels). Access decisions are based on rules in the form of digital access control policies, defining how these factors will be used to make access decisions that balance mission need and security posture given the operational situation at hand.
ARCHITECTING IDENTITY AND ACCESS MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONALITY
The Government has been working to establish an architecture for IDAM planning and implementation [3, 4] . Figure 1 depicts the framework or architecture adopted by the Federal CIOs. The DoD also issued an engineering blueprint for their implementation of Policy Based Access Control (PBAC) planning [5] . This paper is aligned with these efforts. Being able to allocate and control access to enterprise system resources is critical to ensure that the highest priorities are supported, during normal operations or when services are degraded (e.g., during system malfunctions, network outages, or peak demands). Leveraging systems engineering processes to ensure this management framework is viable will be critical to its success. Controlling access and sharing enterprise information is another facet of Identity and Access Management (IDAM), in this case to limit access to information that may be sensitive or classified, where distribution is intended to be limited to individuals, organizations (e.g., departments) or other segments of the enterprise population. Boundary defenses are one means of controlling that access to only those who are authorized to access the enterprise. However additional controls are needed to prevent access by inadvertent user error, adversaries that penetrate the enterprise external protection b trusted insiders with malicious intent. 
IdentityDefinition:
An entity (human user Entity, NPE) can be granted access to a req resource or information object. As shown in Fig access has four underlying functions: identifyin (and recipient if different) and the characterist that have been allocated to him; characterizing or resources being requested; making a decis access request should or should not be granted that decision. The actual mechanisms for imp functions can range from a basic go/no-go stru fine-grained control approach. Early solutions name and password scheme to identify the requ access control list of authorized users to make a and choosing to allow or prevent the requested that decision.
Figure 2 System Identity and Access Managemen 2.2 Identifying and Characterizing the Req
Management): Within the context of an enterpr could be a human user, or a device, applic process etc., which is referred to as a Non-Perso Recently, the White House released a Nation Cyberspace Identities [6] . There are a num Management strategies aligned with specific tec biometrics) or organizations, including the Defense [7] . The identity of the requester is consideration when making an access decision the following:
• This can be as simple as a user having ph the enterprise, by virtue of being allow ion being requested based on on e.g., a repository on the enterprise that has been controlled and ensured to contain information within a logical grouping, such as a particular classification level of information, a specific mission or community of interest, or has limited distribution • Use of a simple tagging structure, where each data element contains with it some description of the attributes of that element; and • Use of metadata, which is associated with each element of information that is bound to each data element; the metadata tagging can be managed within or external to the data element with which it is associated.
IDAM is a systems engineering process that can also be applied to other enterprise resources, such as transport mechanisms.
Here, access may be based on the entity's attributes and the characterization of the resource. In the example of a transport service, access could be based on the quality of service the current transport mechanisms can support. In this case, access control could be used to enforce a prioritization scheme, which ensures that only high priority transactions are permitted when transmission capacity is limited.
Making an Access Decision:
Underlying the IDAM operation is the ability to make access decisions based on access rules. These rules may be explicit, as an access policy in a digital format used by a sophisticated decision engine, or implicit, such that if conditions are met (e.g., user possesses an authentic identity token), access is granted. IDAM techniques are typically characterized by the basis for making an access decision, as highlighted in Table 1 .
Table 1 Characterization of Typical System Access Control Techniques

Enforcing an Access Decision:
The ability to actually control access is the foundation of any IDAM capability. Without this capability, or with the possibility of an adversary being able to circumvent or bypass the enforcement mechanism, unauthorized entities have open access. Enforcement mechanisms can be provided by the following:
• Physical means such as being given a combination of a physical key to a locking mechanism that protects a resource.
• Embedded enforcement of an access decision within a resource that provides access such as a repository or mission system e.g., PK enabling of a mission application.
• An appliance that provides the mechanism to either allow or deny access. This appliance can then block or otherwise prevent access requests from being provided to the resource being requested.
MANAGING AND GOVERNING ACCESS IN AN ENTERPRISE ENVIRONMENT
From an enterprise perspective, selection of types of access control mechanisms can be influenced by the following: Recognizing that these partners will likely reta for their sovereign capabilities, enterprise owne federation approach, which will bring members under a common governance structure. Fede would develop, select and ratify federated sp policies, enabling interoperability and understanding of potential risk that may be cre owner authorizes each external connection. would enable interoperability and still allow the autonomy for their specific implementations solutions have to accept federated identity crede issued by an external enterprise and comply policies and processes approved by a federa body. The enterprise can choose to eithe capability to authenticate these credentials, or external enterprise to use its authentication serv similar choices for managing attributes, where th integrate external partners attributes within Management services or enables access to a external enterprise. Another approach to enable interoperability partners is to treat requests from these entitie members of logical groups based on some mem It may be practical to accept any requests enterprise via a carefully controlled gateway structure could assign credentials with associate in essence proxy these requests using these crede 4.0 DEPLOYMENT OF SYSTEM ACCESS Being able to control access requires care planning, which can be aligned with the phys structure of the enterprise, and tailored for spe require that access protection. As shown in Fig  several points where deployment of access co can be considered. There is traditionally an structure associated with user log-on to a works could be at the point workstations access the en an Network Access Control (NAC); another where a user on a workstation requests acces service to obtain connectivity to an enterprise se system; and then to request an associated servic mission system or to specific information w system.
Stability of Access Decision Factors
External Partners
As depicted in the figure, PvM access controls at external and internal enterprise (securi applications (mission data repositories) and ent and network devices (e.g., access to workstatio of router tables). Providing effective access con access points and gateways is a line of defen requires high demand rates and fairly limited coming to the y. The IDAM ed attributes and entials. S CONTROLS eful deployment sical and logical ecific assets that gure 3, there are ontrol structures n access control station; a second nterprise such as is at the point ss to a transport ervice or mission ce, or access to a within a such a are also needed ity) boundaries, terprise services, ons and updating ntrol at boundary se that typically access decision factors. On the other hand, as PvM closer to information and resourc lower; however there are typically have to be considered for every ac size-fits-all situation.
Figure 3 Notional Enterprise Sys
Selection of access control struct would depend on the anticipated so of the request demand rates, and th decision (typically associated wit discussed earlier). Another facto limitations of devices that implementation of an access contro implemented in a constrained phys cell phone, or smart phone. One representative example of th deployment considerations is for lo would typically be infrequent, limit of users, and requires a coarse dec log-on attempt). Log-on of a wo user) to the enterprise has similar to be augmented with complemen sign-on, where a user is required t once per session; from that point o would perform subsequent log-o transparent to the user. Deploying access controls at an transport service would expect t demand rates, and the access somewhat more granular, particul priority allocation scheme. The na system access point can vary; the d on the functions of the system and access to the information it provid fine-grained control for informati access policy for each category of i to accommodate dynamic changes and attributes of the requester (and is different than the requester), information object requested, and factors.
OPERATING IN A VIR ENVIRONM
With the rapid advances in the I marketplace, enterprise environm imperative that IA solutions keep M access controls are deployed ce assets, demand rates are y more decision factors that ccess request. It is not a onestem Access Control Points tures at these various points ources of requests, projections he sophistication of the access th the degree of granularity or may be possible physical may be considered for ol point e.g., log-on capability sical package such as a PDA, he overarching selection and og-on at a workstation, which ted to a restricted set or group cision (e.g., accept or reject a rkstation (and the associated characteristics, but may need ntary services such as single to execute a log-on sequence on, the single sign-on service on sequences automatically, n enterprise service level, a to have significantly higher control decisions could be larly if it is implementing a ature of controls at a mission demand rates would be based d the mission dependence on des; it may also require very on, possibly factoring in an information object, the ability in those policies, the identity d possibly the recipient if that the characteristics of the d mission or environmental RTUALIZED SYSTEM MENT Information Technology (IT) ments are not static. It is p pace with these advances.
The current emphasis on virtual processing and cloud services are viewed as the next major step in the resulting evolution, and IDAM capabilities have to be planned to adjust or evolve to function effectively in that environment.
How IDAM Would Work in the Cloud:
At a functional level, IDAM services will be needed to operate in these environments, much the same as they would in more traditional enterprise structures. There are special concerns for controlling access that virtual environments do raise including:
• In the Enterprise, IDAM solutions have to provide a reliable and operationally effective capability to identify requesters, make access decisions and enforce those decisions for enterprise services, capabilities, systems, and information. The discussions above discuss the capabilities required for this scenario.
• Applied to Cloud, this situation considers an environment where IDAM solutions are implemented outside the cloud, but serve crypto devices and mechanisms that are implemented within the cloud. This scenario is appropriate to the extent that IDAM capabilities can be structured as a logically separate enterprise services. This could be the case for gateways and external connections where there may be physically separate embodiments demand rates are modest, and latency may not be critical. It does require that when requests for access are encountered, the IDAM services have to be invoked.
• The approach is desirable since the IDAM enterprise service could be implemented, controlled and operated as a traditional enterprise solution, offering the same level of reliability and confidence (assurance) as otherwise traditional IA solutions. This deployment approach may be consistent with requester identification and access decision formulation. It could be more complicated if the enforcement mechanisms are also centralized, rather than maintained closer to the resources being controlled. If these functions are implemented within the cloud, a means is necessary to ensure that the enforcement mechanisms are invoked and cannot be bypassed.
• In the Cloud, there are considerations in addition to those discussed above. These are primarily concerned with the ability to identify and authenticate requester (and if different, recipient) identities, characterize the requested resource or information object (depending on the IDAM approach adopted), formulate an access decision and enforce that decision in a virtual environment. The scenarios discuss the overall functionality needed within a traditional enterprise and the implications of invoking an IDAM service and enforcing access decision performed in a cloud. The scenario extends to include considerations for implementing IDAM identity management and decision formulation processes in the cloud as well.
• Depending on the access control approach adopted, these functions may be tightly coupled to many other enterprise capabilities including: managing identity credentials and attributes; administering authorizations (e.g., ACLs if they are adopted); characterizing enterprise service resources typically using enterprise management capabilities; characterizing information objects (enterprise metadata management; controlling access rules (if they are dynamically managed like a Policy Management service); obtaining mission attributes; and of course identifying which decision factors are needed, obtain those factors, and formulating an access decision. Access to authoritative providers of these factors is simplified if they are also implemented within the cloud environment. If they are addressed external to the cloud, the IDAM solutions have to consider the implications to maintaining access via the cloud's external interface protection.
• By addressing these functions within a cloud environment does reopen the possibility of deploying these capabilities closer to the information and resources being protected, which could address concerns about latency. However, it does raise considerations for reliability, assurance of invocation, protection again the possibility of bypassing or otherwise circumventing the IDAM capabilities, assurance that the correct factors are accessed and the decision formulation being performed correctly, of course the access decision is enforced properly.
• Public versus Private Clouds impacts the population that is allowed unrestricted access to the cloud environment. The embodiment for IDAM capabilities is basically the same for either cloud structure. A public cloud is generally open to all, enabling open access to adversaries as well as those who have legitimate reasons for its use. Private clouds have some degree of protection to ensure that only those personnel and processes that are properly authorized can access the cloud. There is still concern with possible cyber attacks by adversaries that can defeat the private cloud's access control mechanisms as well as exploitation by subverted insiders. It may be necessary to incorporate more stringent protection and higher confidence (assurance) on the IDAM embodiments for use in public clouds. However since the enterprise security posture is dependent on the ability to ensure that only authorized entities can obtain access to critical enterprise resources and information, it is likely that implementation of the most effective protections would still be warranted.
New Threats and Weaknesses:
The rapid advances that industry continues to sustain in IT makes the enterprise environment more attractive to users, increasing processing capacities and transmission speeds, enhancing applications and service capabilities, easing operations by users, reducing costs and enabling more efficient operations. The broader acceptance of enterprise capabilities by virtually every military, government, industry and personal community makes it a more attractive target for cyber attacks. The scope, sophistication and effectiveness of attacks continue to expand at an ever-increasing rate and are expected to continue at this pace.
From Boundary to fine granular protection:
Operating in a virtual environment brings with it new threats and weaknesses that have to be considered. With Cloud computing, our data could literally be stored on the same server as our competitors or adversaries. Rather than having direct or even indirect control over your data, it's pretty much at the mercy of your provider.
The decision of putting critical data on a server that we don't physically control changes the fundamental security paradigm. The best approach in protecting data in this environment is adopting a fine grained access control where each data element is tagged with security meta-data that identifies its sensitivity level, originators, and authorized recipients. The second part is developing a real-time automated policy interpretation and application to all access points where new policy, threat level, and laws of the land are interpreted into digital policy that governs all access points. The last part is the development of an automated secure configuration management system that interrogated the secure audit system and applies patches, and policy restrains to ensure that all the enterprise components are secure to a predictable levels. Until we have the security issues resolved, most companies will keep their hardware and software resources under their internal control. When companies outsource data center functions, the protection of the data becomes a joint effort where the customer should be given access to the audit and monitoring reports.
Insider threat versus external attacks:
Whether launching attacks from outside the enterprise and penetrating its boundary protection, or subverting insiders to launch attacks from within, it is becoming necessary to layer defenses. Controlling access to critical enterprise resources (services and information) is a critical protection measure. With the recent push to the use of virtual processing environments with what has become cloud technologies, threats have to be re-examined to determine what new vulnerabilities will surface that can be exploited by our cyber adversaries. Private clouds provide some level of control to restrict or limit access to the services they provide. Beyond that, virtual implementations of IDAM embodiments still lack the physical control of those implemented in a traditional environment.
ALTERNATIVES
Within a virtual environment, there are basic options for IDAM implementations. User workstation or client log-on, by its nature is embedded within the client device. If the processing is embedded within the device, the type of enterprise does not impact the IDAM structure. Based on the implementation, there are alternatives to be considered in implementing IDAM structures. In some instantiations (e.g., thin clients) the log-on processing is performed in the enterprise. In these cases, the transactions between the user and that processing (via the client or workstation) have to be protected. With that, it is still necessary to incorporate some means to ensure that the processing is not bypassed or circumvented so accurate access decisions and their enforcement are assured.
Beyond initial log-on, IDAM capabilities will most likely be implemented in one form or another within the environment. As with traditional enterprise environments, there is the basic IDAM functionality required to identify and characterize the requester, make a decision to grant or deny access, and to enforce that decision. There are options for the locations for their deployments at various access control points across the enterprise, driven by which resources and information require access protection, the architecture of the overall enterprise. At each access control point, there are also options for selection of the access control techniques that are driven by the degree of granularity needed, the latency that can be tolerated to retain mission effectiveness, the level of access control protection required, and the level of protection and degree of assurance that can be obtained given state-of-the-practice for each solution.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The DoD and IC have both established an information strategy for their respective communities that implement the national level information sharing strategy. An IDAM capability is a fundamental building block to address these strategies. Given that business and mission environments will transition to the use of virtual environments if only to achieve IT efficiencies, this paper discusses additional advantages inherent in virtual environments.
If the security posture of the overarching enterprise relies on layered defense architecture, the IDAM capabilities provide what may be a last line of defense for controlling access to critical enterprise information and resources. Implementing IDAM capabilities separate from but interfacing to the cloud allows dedicated operations of what in essence becomes an enterprise service. Moving this implementation within the cloud drives the need to establish effective new approaches to ensure the quality and confidence (assurance) of the embodiments.
In a virtual system environment, there are several dimensions to the IDAM solution that will be needed to replace the confidence (assurance) that is implicitly provided by locally controlled and operated implementations. This includes assurance that each IDAM mechanism is invoked (replacing installation as an inline process); that it is implemented and executed correctly (replacing the design assurance and analysis), that it obtains authoritative information to make an accurate access decision, and implements a means to enforce that decision.
